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Could	Brexit	lead	to	a	revival	of	the	Weimar	Triangle?
The	so	called	‘Weimar	Triangle’	is	a	framework	for	cooperation	between	France,	Germany	and
Poland.	While	meetings	have	been	held	under	the	format	since	1991,	the	last	full	summit	involving
heads	of	state	took	place	in	2011.	Bartlomiej	Kulpa	examines	whether	the	reshaping	of	the	EU
following	Brexit	might	lead	to	a	revival	of	the	framework.
Europeans	have	always	dreamt	of	exerting	global	influence	commensurate	with	their	economic	weight.
The	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU	will	have	far-reaching	geopolitical	implications	in	this	respect,	not	only	for	Britain
but	also	for	the	EU	itself.	In	practice,	Brexit	will	change	the	balance	of	power	within	the	EU.	In	light	of	this,	the	future
of	the	EU	will	be	decided	by	two	factors,	namely	social	prosperity	and	a	lasting	peace.
One	question	that	is	worth	considering	is	whether	Britain’s	departure	from	the	EU	might	revive	the	French-German-
Polish	‘Weimar	Triangle’,	which	could	subsequently	act	as	a	driving	force	for	future	EU	prosperity.	This	tripartite
partnership	was	initiated	in	Weimar,	the	city	of	polymath	genius	Johann	Wolfgang	von	Goethe,	in	August	1991.	The
most	recent	meeting	under	the	Weimar	Triangle	format	took	place	in	Lens,	Pas-de-Calais,	in	January	2020,	but	the
last	full	summit	involving	heads	of	state	was	in	2011.	Of	the	three	countries,	Poland	has	traditionally	been	the	most
“pro-Weimarian”.	From	a	political	point	of	view,	the	Weimar	Triangle	could	(but	does	not)	serve	as	a	bridge	between
the	members	and	non-members	of	the	Eurozone,	though	the	partnership	is	not	formally	an	organisation	under
international	law.
Energy	security
One	of	the	areas	where	Paris,	Berlin	and	Warsaw	have	different	opinions	is	the	EU’s	energy	policy.	As	the	Polish
economy	is	heavily	reliant	on	coal-fired	power	stations,	Poland	did	not	sign	up	to	the	EU’s	2050	decarbonisation
target	agreed	by	European	leaders	in	December	2019.	Furthermore,	Germany’s	decision	to	negotiate	directly	and
bilaterally	with	Russia	over	the	construction	of	the	Nord	Stream	twin	pipeline	system	going	through	the	Baltic	Sea
(and	therefore	avoiding	Poland	and	the	Baltic	republics)	led	to	anger	and	frustration	in	Poland.	Energy	security	is	a
top	priority	for	Warsaw.	For	example,	Poland	has	recently	announced	that	the	Baltic	Pipe,	which	is	a	strategic
infrastructure	project	to	transport	gas	from	Norway	to	the	Danish	and	Polish	markets,	would	be	launched	on	1
October	2022.	The	Baltic	Pipe	would	increase	the	country’s	energy	diversification.
EU	policy	toward	Ukraine
Another	issue	of	crucial	importance	is	the	EU’s	policy	toward	Ukraine.	It	should	be	stressed	that	Poland	was	the
first	country	to	officially	recognise	the	independence	of	Ukraine	in	1991.	Subsequently,	as	an	EU	member	state,
Poland	has	become	a	staunch	advocate	of	Ukraine’s	reforms	and	European	path.	However,	France’s	approach	has
been	a	major	obstacle	to	developing	an	effective	EU	policy	toward	Ukraine.	Unlike	Berlin	and	Warsaw,	Paris	has
tried	to	forge	a	new	relationship	with	Moscow,	gambling	that	reaching	out	to	the	Kremlin	can	turn	Russia	into	a
security	partner	for	the	EU.	What	is	more,	as	the	most	recent	examples	of	Albania	and	North	Macedonia	show,
France	has	no	appetite	for	further	enlargement	of	the	EU.
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French	Minister	for	European	Affairs,	Amélie	de	Montchalin,	at	a	Weimar	Triangle	meeting	with	her	German	and	Polish	counterparts
in	January	2020,	Credit:	francediplomatie	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	Franco-Polish	relations	have	soured	since	the	Polish	government	decided	to	cancel	a
multibillion-euro	military	helicopter	deal	with	Airbus	in	2016.	Although	Emmanuel	Macron	visited	Poland	in
February,	this	was	his	first	visit	to	Poland	since	he	took	the	helm	as	French	President	in	2017.	As	long	as	the	ruling
right-wing	Law	and	Justice	Party	(PiS)	is	perceived	by	France	to	be	violating	the	rule	of	law	and	dismantling	the
independent	judiciary	in	Poland,	there	is	unlikely	to	be	room	for	improvement	in	bilateral	relations.
Military	operations
The	next	issue	that	has	to	be	addressed	is	the	Iraq	War	that	began	in	2003.	There	was	considerable	disagreement
between	France,	Germany	and	Poland	over	the	conflict.	Paris	and	Berlin	bitterly	opposed	US	involvement	in	Iraq,
whereas	Warsaw	backed	the	US	military	plans	for	intervention.
Similarly,	Paris,	Berlin	and	Warsaw	did	not	speak	with	one	voice	when	in	January	2013	France	launched	Operation
Serval	to	halt	the	forward	movement	of	armed	Islamist	insurgents	in	Mali.	It	was	alleged,	at	the	time,	that	France
was	attempting	to	use	the	EU	member	states	to	continue	its	strong	influence	on	the	francophone	countries	of	West
Africa	and	this	was	one	of	the	reasons	why	Germany	and	Poland	were	hesitant	about	joining	the	campaign.
Moreover,	as	far	as	Poland	is	concerned,	Polish	foreign	policy	does	not	primarily	focus	on	Africa.	In	practice,
Poland’s	outlook	toward	the	continent	is	limited	to	North	Africa.	Hence,	its	business,	political	and	diplomatic
presence	on	the	continent	is	insubstantial.	It	should	also	be	noted	that,	unlike	France	and	Germany,	Poland
considers	itself	a	potential	reference	country	for	any	African	nation	going	through	a	transition	to	democracy.
The	benefits	of	the	Weimar	Triangle	remain	largely	symbolic.	Furthermore,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	term	‘triangle’
does	not	amount	to	an	apt	description	of	trilateral	relations	between	France,	Germany	and	Poland.	First,	the	three
actors	are	far	from	equal:	France	and	Poland	do	not	have	as	much	influence	on	Germany	as	France	and	Germany
have	on	Poland.	Second,	the	three	countries	compete	economically	and	politically	with	each	other	within	the	EU
and	on	the	international	scene.	What	is	more,	since	Poland	is	one	of	the	two	countries	that	launched	the	Three
Seas	Initiative	in	2015,	which	is	comprised	of	12	EU	member	states,	it	is	likely	that	Warsaw	will	treat	this	project	as
being	more	geostrategically	important	than	other	frameworks	such	as	the	Weimar	Triangle.
As	such,	a	revival	of	the	Weimar	Triangle	seems	unlikely	in	the	near	future.	France,	Germany	and	Poland	are
presently	more	divided	than	united.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	Paris,	Berlin	and	Warsaw	should	not	try	to
reach	a	consensus	on	various	issues,	such	as	energy	security	and	Ukraine.	In	order	to	do	so,	the	three	actors
ought	to	engage	in	a	serious	political	dialogue.	That	would	enable	them	to	improve	mutual	understanding,
overcome	negative	perceptions	and	develop	the	common	tools	needed	to	tackle	shared	political	and	economic
problems.
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Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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